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Abstract—Trust is a critical issue in human-robot interactions:
as robotic systems gain complexity, it becomes crucial for them to
be able to blend in our society by maximizing their acceptability
and reliability. Various studies have examined how trust is
attributed by people to robots, but less have investigated the
opposite scenario, where a robot is the trustor and a human is the
trustee. The ability for an agent to evaluate the trustworthiness
of its sources of information is particularly useful in joint task
situations where people and robots must collaborate to reach
shared goals. We propose an artificial cognitive architecture
based on the developmental robotics paradigm that can estimate
the trustworthiness of its human interactors for the purpose of
decision making. This is accomplished using Theory of Mind
(ToM), the psychological ability to assign to others beliefs and
intentions that can differ from one’s owns. Our work is focused
on an humanoid robot cognitive architecture that integrates a
probabilistic ToM and trust model supported by an episodic
memory system. We tested our architecture on an established
developmental psychological experiment, achieving the same
results obtained by children, thus demonstrating a new method
to enhance the quality of human and robot collaborations.
Keywords—trust, theory of mind, episodic memory, cognitive
robotics, developmental robotics, human-robot interaction
I. INTRODUCTION
The technological revolution taking place in the fields of
robotics and artificial intelligence seems to indicate a future
shift in our human-centered social paradigm towards a greater
inclusion of artificial cognitive agents in our everyday en-
vironments. This means that collaborative scenarios between
humans and robots will become more frequent and will have
a deeper impact on everyday life. In this setting, research
regarding trust in human-robot interactions (HRI) assumes a
major importance in order to ensure the highest quality of
the interaction itself, as trust directly affects the willingness
of people to accept information produced by a robot and to
cooperate with it. Many studies have already explored trust
that humans give to robots and how this can be enhanced by
tuning both the design and the behavior of the machine, but not
so much research has focused on the opposite scenario, that
is the trust that artificial agents can assign to people. Despite
this, the latter is a critical factor in joint tasks where humans
and robots depend on each other’s effort to achieve a shared
goal: whereas a robot can fail, so can a person. For an artificial
agent to know when to trust or distrust somebody and adapt its
plans to this prediction can make the difference in the success
or failure of the task.
Our work is centered on the design and development of an
artificial cognitive architecture for a humanoid autonomous
robot that incorporates trust, Theory of Mind and episodic
memory, as we believe these are the three key factors for
the purpose of estimating the trustworthiness of others. We
have tested our architecture on an established developmental
psychology experiment [1] and the results we obtained confirm
that our approach successfully models trust mechanisms and
dynamics in cognitive robots.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Trust is a fundamental, unavoidable component of social
interactions that can be defined as the willingness of a party
(the trustor) to rely on the actions of another party (the trustee)
with the former having no control over the latter [2]. Moreover,
to trust somebody to accomplish a specific task is to believe
that he or she is reliable and committed towards the task. At
the same time, distrust is not the mere absence of trust but,
instead, the belief that the other party is committed and at
the same time non-reliable [3]. Trust is involved in every sort
of social interaction and is a key factor in the achievement of
successful relationships, in our personal safety [4] and in team
cooperation [5].
The development of trust during childhood is still under debate
by developmental psychologists. Erikson [6] theorized that
infants not older than 2 years pass through a stage known as
“trust vs mistrust”, where their propensity to trust is shaped
by the quality of care received. This happens because infants
highly depend upon the caregivers for sustenance and learn
whether or not the latter regularly satisfy their basic needs,
either learning that the world is a secure, trustable environment
or an undependable, insecure place.
A psychological trait that relates to the mastery of one’s self
trustfulness is Theory of Mind (ToM): the ability to attribute
mental states to others (for instance beliefs, intentions and
desires), that may differ from one’s owns. In fact, the ability
to correctly judge the trustworthiness of others is strongly
correlated to the matureness of this trait [7] because a mature
ToM allows to perform behavior prediction and provides
clues on trustworthiness. [8]. Despite ToM being universal
in adults, the same cannot be said about preschoolers: whilst
the latter are not completely lacking some form of ToM, this
slowly develops with age [9, 10]. An experiment conducted
by Vanderbilt [1] demonstrated that ToM matures around the
fourth year of age and is completely developed by the fifth
year.
Whereas trust is such an important factor in human interac-
tions, it is also an essential component of HRI, in the sense
that a great degree of trust improves the quality of interactions
with the robot and, vice versa, successful interactions enhance
the machine’s trustworthiness from the user’s point of view.
Hawley [3] states that inanimate objects can be reliable but
not genuinely trustworthy. This does not apply to humanoid
robots, which are artificial agents that can communicate and
interact and, by adopting the participant stance, can be worthy
of trust or distrust (or neither) from their human partners [11].
In human and robot teaming scenarios, where the two share a
common goal, trust is an essential component to successfully
perform joint activities [12].
Our work is based on an established framework known as
developmental robotics. Cangelosi [13] defined it as “the
approach to the design of behavioral and cognitive capabilities
in artificial agents that takes direct inspiration from the devel-
opmental principles and mechanisms observed in the natural
cognitive systems of children”.
Whereas various studies have focused on trust in HRI contexts,
with a human trustor and a robot trustee, our work aims in
investigating the opposite, that is the level of trust assigned
from a robot to its human partners. We state that a robot
involved in a joint task with a human should be able to evaluate
the trustworthiness of the latter and use this information
to perform decision making. For example, in a hypothetical
situation where the goal is to move some furniture around the
house, it is equally important for both the robot and the human
to trust the other’s ability to perform the job and eventually
to dynamically adapt the plan. This can assume a greater
importance in more critical scenarios, as in the performance
of robotic-assisted surgery. Our aim is to design an artificial
cognitive architecture able to evaluate the trustworthiness of
the humans it interacts with, in order to predict their future
behavior. We believe that the key to such an architecture is the
implementation of a ToM module in a robotic agent. Our work
builds upon the research of Patacchiola [14] who designed a
Bayesian model that incorporates aspects of ToM and trust
and applied it to the Vanderbilt experiment [1]. We took these
findings a step further, expanding and incorporating them into
a robotic system that can learn to distinguish trustable and
distrustable sources of information and that can modify its
behavior according to its belief, thus remarking that it is
possible to adopt a probabilistic approach to model and adapt
ToM and trust in a unified scheme. Our system was able
to reproduce the results obtained by Vanderbilt [1] on both
mature and immature ToMs.
Lastly, we aimed in supporting this trust and ToM architecture
with an episodic memory system which made it possible for
the robot to make predictions about novel human informants
with which it had never familiarized with. Episodic memory
is a subcategory of the long-term declarative memory that
stores memories about temporally dated episodes or events
and temporal-spatial relations among them [15]. Knowledge
of one’s personal history enhances the ability to accomplish
several cognitive capabilities and is strictly related to the sense
of self and consciousness. That is why many researchers have
focused on the design of artificial episodic memory systems
[16, 17]. Our idea led us to the implementation of a system
that is able to use its past interactions memories to influence its
behavior towards someone it never interacted with before. This
means that the robot will develop a personal character, based
upon the way it has been treated in the past, that will make it
more or less keen to trust someone it does not know, as is the
case with infants in the “trust vs mistrust” phase theorized
by Erikson [6]. This general and generic first impression
towards the novelty will then be subsequently reshaped by
the interactions it will experience: for instance, if the robot
distrusts someone that subsequently proves to be a helper,
its behavior will slowly change. We accomplished this by
designing an algorithm inspired by the particle filter [18, 19],
a technique widely used for mobile robot localization.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
The objective of our research is to implement an artificial
cognitive architecture for a humanoid robot that incorporates
a probabilistic unified trust and ToM module to evaluate the
trustworthiness of human partners involved in joint tasks,
paired with an episodic memory system. To reach our goal, we
designed and developed a cognitive robotic system that is able
to be subjected to a developmental psychology trial [1] and
to obtain the same results as either an under or over 5 years
child, therefore successfully simulating the children’s cognitive
abilities and ToM immatureness or matureness, respectively.
A. Theoretical Background
The psychology test we aimed to reproduce is the one
designed by Vanderbilt [1], in particular experiment number
1: 90 preschool-age children, equally divided in 3-, 4- and 5-
years-olds, were shown a video in which an adult actor, either a
helper or a tricker, gave advice to another adult that was trying
to locate a sticker hidden in one of two boxes. Helpers would
suggest the correct location, whilst the trickers always pointed
to the wrong box. Subsequently, that same pointer would give
some advice to the child on the same sticker-finding task, and
the participant would decide if to follow that suggestion or not.
Based on the children’s choices and on some meta-cognitive
questions submitted to them, Vanderbilt theorized that only
the 5-year-olds were able to differentiate the helpers from the
trickers, therefore demonstrating to possess a mature ToM.
In order to substitute one of the preschoolers with a hu-
manoid robot, the latter needs to possess a trust and ToM
computational model to be able to predict the intentions
and beliefs of the pointers it is going to interact with. A
good candidate for this model is the developmental Bayesian
model of trust designed by Patacchiola [14] which uses a
probabilistic approach to solve the problem of trust estimation.
Bayesian Networks (BNs) are probabilistic graphical models
that represent conditional dependencies between a set of
random variables. This particular model uses discrete Boolean
variables that assume two states: a and b, each corresponding
to one of the two positions where the stickers can be located
in the experiment. A graphical illustration of this BN can be
observed in Figure 1: the two nodes XR and YR represent
respectively the beliefs and actions of the robot. The posterior
distribution of the node YR allows the agent to choose the
action to perform: that means searching for the sticker in
position a or b. The connection between YI and YR represents
the influence that the opinions of the informant have on the
agent’s action. The action of the agent is then a consequence
of its own belief XR and the informant action YI . Lastly, the
estimation of XI , the informant’s belief, makes the agent able
to effectively discriminate a trickery from a non-malevolent
human error. The cognitive architecture we designed creates
one of these BNs for each informant it interacts with and uses
it to predict its future behavior.
This developmental Bayesian model has been extended with
an episodic memory system that will be described more in
detail in Section III-D.
Fig. 1. The BN that models the relation between the robot and an informant.
The agent generates a separate network for each user, with the same structure
but different probability distribution.
B. Cognitive System Architecture
An overview of our robotic architecture is show in Fig-
ure 2. This cognitive system interfaces with each informant
individually and performs various perception and actuation
tasks. The audio module is used to synthesize vocal outputs
to guide the users through the course of the experiment and
to process vocal commands. The motor module is responsible
of piloting the robot’s joints and controlling its head and body
movements. The vision module is in charge of face detection
and recognition through Haar Cascade [20] and Local Binary
Pattern Histogram [21] machine learning algorithms and also
to detect the presence of the sticker on the table. The belief
module is the core component which makes the robot able
to evaluate the trustworthiness of the informant that has been
recognized, eventually using its episodic memory to generate
a new BN on the fly in order to react to a novel user.
C. Belief
The belief unit encircles all the algorithms that deal with
the Bayesian belief networks. One of its functions is to
store episodes, which are data structures that encode sticker
searching events inclusive of both the sticker position and the
suggestion received from the informer. The way by which this
data is created depends on the agent’s ToM matureness: in
case of a misleading suggestion, the immature agent associates
the action YI to the wrong belief XI , whereas the agent
with mature ToM identifies the deception and recognizes that
YI = ¬XI . Because of this deficit in reading the informant’s
intention, the agent with immature ToM collects wrong statis-
tical data that will distort inference in subsequent phases.
Once the agent has collected a certain amount of episodes from
an informant, it can generate a BN associated to him or her
using the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) algorithm
[22] to determine the conditional probability tables of its
nodes. For the root nodes XI and XR we calculate these
probabilities as:
PY (a) = θ
PY (b) = 1− θ
(1)
Denoting Na and Nb as the number of times the pointer
chooses a or b, we can estimate θ as:
θˆ =
Na
Na +Nb
(2)
For the nodes YI and YR, instead, we have to also take into
consideration the influence of the parents.
Once a BN has been created for a certain user and its param-
eters have been learned from the interactions, it is possible
to infer the posterior probability of the nodes given some
observations. In particular, we are interested in estimating the
belief given an action and vice versa. We calculate posterior
distributions using Pearl’s Message-Passing algorithm [23].
D. Episodic Memory
The ability to use one’s own past memories to take decisions
in the present and future is an important ability that enhances
cognitive processes. An implementation of such skill would
enable the robot to react reasonably towards novel informant
with which it has never familiarized with. On a technical level,
the main problem is to generate on the fly a new BN with
adequate parameters to use with that unknown informer. These
parameters will depend upon the robot’s personal character
built in respect of the way it has been treated in the past:
an agent which has been tricked often would learn to be
mistrustful and vice versa, as in the “trust vs mistrust” phase
in child development [6].
The design guidelines that we followed in the creation of
our algorithm were the following: memories fade away with
time, the details become blurred proportionally to the amount
of memories possessed, shocking events as surprises and
betrayals should be more difficult to forget than ordinary,
expected experiences.
Fig. 2. Architecture of the artificial cognitive agent. The human informant interacts with the robot through the vision and audio modules, which respectively
perform image processing (face detection and recognition) and vocal command parsing. Data then flows to the motor module, in charge of the robot’s joints,
and to the belief module that manages the collection of BNs memorized by the agent.
Our algorithm draws inspiration from the particle filter tech-
nique widely used in mobile robot localization [18]. Whenever
an unknown informant is met, this component generates on the
fly a certain number of episodes to train a new BN.
We define the set of BNs memorized by the agent as:
S = [s0, s1, ..., sn] (3)
Where n is the number of informants known by the agent.
Each BN si was generated by a set of episodes, and these are
going to be denoted as replay datasets for that BN:
Esi = [ε
(si)
0 , ε
(si)
1 , ..., ε
(si)
m ] : si ∈ S (4)
Where m is equal to the number of episodes of the replay
dataset. So, in this notation ε(si)j represents the j-th episode
of the replay dataset that formed the BN si.
The equation we are about to introduce uses information
theory to quantify the amount of information each specific
episode represents. Our goal is to find how much this value
differs from the total entropy of its replay dataset: a high
difference means that the event is to be considered surprising
and must be easier to recall than ordinary, unsurprising events.
For example, if an informant who is always been trustful
suddenly tricks the agent, this betrayal will be remembered
with a greater impact. At the same time, all of the memories
are subject to a progressive time degradation that tends to blur
them with a timing dependent on their importance.
Formally, a real factor denoted as importance value v defined
in the interval [0, 1] is calculated for every episode ε(si)j as the
difference between the amount of information of the episode,
I(ε
(si)
j ), and the total entropy of its replay dataset, H(Esi),
divided by the discrete temporal difference from the time when
the memory was formed.
v(ε
(si)
j ) =
| I(ε(si)j )−H(Esi) |
∆t+ 1
=
| − log2 P (ε(si)j ) +
∑
ε∈Esi P (ε) log2 P (ε) |
tpresent − tε(si)j + 1
(5)
Once v has been calculated it can be used to determine a
replication factor by projecting it on a step function defined
as:
F (v) =

0 if 0 ≤ v ≤ 0.005
1 if 0.005 < v ≤ 0.3
2 if 0.3 < v ≤ 0.6
3 if 0.6 < v ≤ 1
(6)
Every episode from each replay dataset in the agent’s
memory is replicated F (v) times.
The thresholds of the step function have been defined by
observing the probability distribution of the importance value
v obtained making the robot interact with five different infor-
mants, the latter characterized by the following percentages
of helpful interactions: 100%, 75%, 50%, 25% and 0%. This
distribution is observable in Figure 3. Most samples tend to
fall in the range [0, 0.3], so samples that are contained in this
interval are kept as they are, with no replications. Samples
included in the intervals (0.3, 0.6] and (0.6, 1] are the most
surprising ones for the agent and get, respectively, duplicated
and triplicated. The bottom 5% of the domain, i.e. v values
less or equals than 0.005, are discarded (they are forgot).
Fig. 3. Consistency values histogram of the episodes memorized by the agent
through progressive interactions with different informants (from 100% helpful
to 100% tricky at 25% steps of variation. The opposite, that is from 100%
tricky to 100% helpful, produces the same graph).
The next step in our algorithm is to pick k episodes to
form the replay dataset for the new BN we intend to create,
Esn+1 . It is possible to select random samples but this will
lead to poor final results, so we instead operate a systematic
resampling [24], a kind of weighted random sampling. To
avoid biases dependent on the two positions in which the
sticker can be located, we want the agent to distinguish only
between positive and negative actions, or “truth” and “lies”:
for this reason, instead of picking k samples the system will
only select k/2 and for each of them it will generate the
corresponding symmetric example. For instance, if a {sticker
in a, correct suggestion} episode is sampled, a {sticker in b,
correct suggestion} episode will also be included in the new
replay dataset.
The optimal number of samples k has been investigated: a
low value would result in a gullible belief network, whilst
a high value would make it stubborn to changes. Our goal
was to let the robot possess a firm but changeable prejudice
about the novel informant. By analyzing the mean entropy of
the episodic networks generated by different values of k, as
showed in Figure 4, we selected k = 10 for the following
reasons: it is an even number, so it will produce an integer
k/2 value, it is neither too low or too high to incur in the
above mentioned problems and, finally, it is a local minimum
of entropy.
Finally, MLE is applied to the new reply dataset to evaluate
the parameters of the network. This new BN will be stored
in the agent’s long term memory as sn+1 and will be used to
predict the trustworthiness of the new informant.
E. Evaluation criteria for belief networks
We introduce the trust factor T as a measure of how keen
is a BN to trust the informant.
Fig. 4. Mean entropy of episodic memory networks generated with different
number of samples. Given the random component intrinsic in the algorithm,
a very large number of samples (105) have been generated for every value of
k.
To calculate T , we hypothetically imagine that the sticker
is located in position a and execute a belief estimation
task, as described in Section IV-B3, to obtain the posterior
probability p of node YI : what we are doing is computing the
probability that the informant will give correct advice given
the matureness of the agent’s ToM. At this point, the value
is scaled in a [−1,+1] interval, where the two endpoints −1
and +1 represent, respectively, complete trickers and helpers,
that means BNs whose parameters have been computed from
replay datasets containing only truthful or untruthful episodes.
Values of T in between represent informants that are partially
helpful and misleading. To perform the scaling we required
the maximum and minimum values of p and we found them
by building two BNs formed by a large (104) number of,
respectively, helpful and misleading episodes and computed p
for each of them, resulting in p = 0.75 for the helper network
and p = 0.25 for the tricker one. For a generic interval [a, b],
the scaling is computed as:
T (p) =
(b− a)(p−min)
max−min + a (7)
With min = 0.25, max = 0.75, a = −1 and b = +1.
Equation 7 is used in Section V to evaluate the experimental
data collected on experiments and simulations.
While experiencing new interactions, the BN can acquire new
statistical data and adapt its behavior over time. This happens
when T changes sign, that is when the number of negative
interactions surpasses the positive ones, or vice versa.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental Setup
For our experiments, we used a Softbank Pepper, a hu-
manoid social robot designed to operate in human environ-
ments. A single table is present in the environment, on top
of which a printed mat, depicting the two positions a and b
and some instructions for the participants, is laid down. The
robot is located on one side of the table, while the informants
take turns in sitting in front of it, on the opposite side of the
desk. The participants are provided with a sticker that they
are able to move between the left and right locations. Each
informant is instructed to act as a helper, always revealing
the correct position of the sticker, or a tricker, always giving
wrong advice.
B. Procedure
As for the original experiment by Vanderbilt [1], our trial
is divided in three sections: familiarization, decision making
and belief estimation. Having already introduced the technical
details of the cognitive architecture, this Section will focus on
describing the logical flow of operations.
Fig. 5. Familiarization phase with a tricker informant. (a) The robot asks for
a suggestion on the sticker’s location. (b) The informant places the sticker
in one of the two positions. (c) The informant gives its suggestion on where
to find the sticker. Note how the tricker gives misleading directions. (d) The
robot searches for the presence of the sticker in the suggested position and
records the episode.
1) Familiarization Phase: The aim of the first phase is to
make the robot familiarize with the informants, that means
learning the correct parameters of the BNs associated to them.
A visual description of the process is showed in Figure 5.
One at a time, each of the informants sit at the table while
the robot captures some face images to be able to recognize
them in the future. The user is given time to place the sticker
on one of the two positions marked on the table, a or b.
After that, the robot asks for a suggestion on the location of
the above-mentioned sticker and, once received, it follows it
blindly, searching for the marker. Based on of the result of this
detection and on the matureness of the robot’s ToM model, an
episode is created in its memory.
Following the original experiment, this demonstrative task is
repeated 6 times per user, with the sticker located 50% of the
time on position a and the other 50% of the time on position
b. At the end of this procedure, the data acquired is used to
build a BN for that informant, as described in section III-C.
The familiarization phase leads the robot into possessing a BN
for every known informant.
Fig. 6. Decision making phase with a tricker informant. (a) The robot asks for
a suggestion on the location of the sticker and receives a misleading suggestion
from the informant. (b) The robot performs inference on that informant’s belief
network. (c) The agent decides that the informant will probably try to trick it,
so it looks in the opposite location. (d) The robot finds the sticker and gives
feedback to the informant.
2) Decision Making Phase: In the decision making phase,
shown in Figure 6, the robot has to correctly locate the
sticker, choosing one of the two locations given the informant’s
opinion. Initially, one informant sits at the table: if he or she
is identified, the associated BN is fetched and used in the
subsequent computations, otherwise a new one is generated
on the fly for him or her using episodic memory.
At this point, the user positions the sticker and gives a
suggestion. The agent performs inference on the BN in order
to calculate the posterior probabilities given YI as evidence.
In particular, if PYR(a) > PYR(b) the robot will investigate
position a and if PYR(a) < PYR(b) it will look at position b.
The episode generated by this interaction will be used to up-
date the parameters of the BN, making the robot progressively
adapt to the user’ behavior.
Fig. 7. Belief estimation phase with a tricker informant. (a) The robot
recognizes the informant using machine learning techniques and looks at the
table to find the position of the sticker. (b) The robot computes inference on
the informant’s belief network and predicts what he would suggest in that
situation.
3) Belief Estimation Phase: In the original trial, children
where asked some meta-cognitive questions in order to inves-
tigate their perception of the informants and to examine their
ToM matureness. To test the same on the artificial cognitive
agent, Bayesian inference can be used.
The belief estimation phase is much similar to the decision
making one and differs only for the kind of inference com-
puted. The robot uses its face detection and recognition algo-
rithms to identify the informant with whom it is interacting,
either a known or an unknown one, then it observes the table
to identify the position of the sticker. Setting XR and YR
as evidence, the Message Passing algorithm [23] is used to
calculate the posterior probabilities for the rest of the network.
At this point, the agent can use the probability distributions
in nodes XI and YI to infer the informant’s belief and the
location that most likely would have been suggested by him
or her. This process is shown in Figure 7.
C. Simulations on Character Formation
In order to test the effects of episodic memory on character
formation, we made a mature ToM simulated agent familiarize
with different sets of informants to study how it would
subsequently react to a novel person. Each set was composed
of 8 informants. In particular, the first set was formed by
8 helpers, the second by 6 helpers and 2 trickers and so
on until the last set was made up of 8 trickers. For each
set of informants familiarized, 100 episodic belief networks
were generated and their trust factors T were computed using
Equation 7 and plotted on a histogram. After each set was
processed, the memory of the robot was reset so that the effects
of each group of informants could be analyzed individually.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Trust and Theory of Mind
The final results of Vanderbilt [1] showed that only the
children with mature ToM distinguished between helpers and
trickers, thus confirming the fact that children’s reasoning
about whom to trust is directly correlated with their un-
derstanding of mental life. Our research is coherent with
these results: when the robot is provided with a mature ToM
model, it is able to correctly recognize realiable sources from
unrealiable ones, accepting suggestion from the former whilst
rejecting it from the latter. In contrast, if the agent is operated
with an immature ToM model, it will fail in the evaluation. To
understand why this happens, we will examine the posterior
distributions in each node of a BN after the inference that takes
place in the Decision Making and Beflief Estimation phases.
Table I shows the results obtained from the interaction of
a helper and a tricker with two agents with, respectively, a
mature and an immature ToM.
In the decision making task, the helper indicated position a
when the sticker was placed in that location. The suggestion
was accepted by both the agents, as demonstrated by the
inequality PYR(a) > PYR(b). The behavior of the agents
differed towards the tricker which, in contrast, suggested
position a when the sticker was located in b. The mature agent
rejected the suggestion and this happened because PYR(a) <
PYR(b), which means that the robot decided to look at the
other location on the table. The immature agent could not
recognize the deception and accepted the misleading advice,
as observable in the posterior distribution PYR(a) > PYR(b),
thus falling in the deception.
During the belief estimation task, with the sticker placed in
a and a helpful informant, both the agents output PXI (a) >
PXI (b) and PYI (a) > PYI (b), thus correctly anticipating the
helper’s mental states. When facing the tricker, instead, the
mature agent correctly predicts the malevolent intentions by
outputting PXI (a) < PXI (b) and PYI (a) < PYI (b), while
the immature agent failed doing so by predicting PXI (a) >
PXI (b) and PYI (a) > PYI (b).
B. Episodic Memory
Given the non-deterministic nature of the algorithm used to
generate episodic belief networks, a more statistical method of
evaluation is needed to report the results of this module. The
histograms of the trust factors T obtained with the procedure
described in Section IV-C can be interpreted as the different
characters that emerge in the robot, that means the tendency
it has to trust or distrust a novel informant based on the
interactions it has been faced with in the past. So, as shown
in Figure 8, an agent who is used to be tricked most of the
time will tend to distrust somebody it meets for the first time,
whereas a robot that has been treated kindly will learn to trust
people and tend to consider them trustworthy until presented
with contrary evidence. This behavior mimics exactly the
“trust vs mistrust” stage of infancy theorized by Erikson [6], in
which children learn to shape their personality by succeeding
or failing in developing trust based on the quality of cares
received during infancy.
Fig. 8. Reliability histogram of episodic belief networks generated by agents
possessing different histories of interactions. Green bars represent trustful BNs
(T > 0) and red bars depict BNs that tend to distrust (T < 0). Agents that
have a more positive than negative background tend to be more prone to trust
a new informant and vice versa. When T = 0 the informant is neither trusted
or distrusted and the agent will act randomly.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we discussed an artificial cognitive architecture
for trust, ToM and episodic memory in a HRI scenario that
Mature ToM Immature ToM
DM BE DM BE DM BE DM BE
a b a b a b a b a b a b a b a b
XR 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.0 XR 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.0
YR 0.65 0.35 1.0 0.0 0.35 0.65 1.0 0.0 YR 0.65 0.35 1.0 0.0 0.65 0.35 1.0 0.0
XI 0.8 0.2 0.57 0.43 0.2 0.8 0.57 0.43 XI 0.8 0.2 0.57 0.43 0.8 0.2 0.57 0.43
YI 1.0 0.0 0.62 0.38 1.0 0.0 0.38 0.62 YI 1.0 0.0 0.62 0.38 1.0 0.0 0.62 0.38
Helper Tricker Helper Tricker
(1) (2)
TABLE I
BN NODE VALUES FOR BOTH A MATURE TOM (1) AND AN IMMATURE TOM (2) AGENT. THE ROWS OF THE TABLES REPRESENT THE POSTERIOR
PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH NODE OF THE NETWORKS, FOR BOTH DECISION MAKING (DM) AND BELIEF ESTIMATION (BE)
TASKS.
can enhance the performance of artificial agents in shared goal
contexts. We have extended the previous work by Patacchi-
ola [14] by integrating the original model into a complete
robotic architecture and extending it with an episodic memory
component which enables it to remember and make use of
its past experiences to develop a personal character and,
doing so, to improve its cognitive abilities.We designed an
artificial agent that is able to interact with the world around it
and estimate the trustworthiness of its information sources to
make autonomous decisions about its actions. We have tested
this architecture by successfully reproducing a developmental
psychology experiment [1] that aimed in evaluating the ToM
degree of the experimental subjects through a sticker finding
game, obtaining consistent results.
In the future, we plan to expand this architecture to make it
progressively more general-purpose: thanks to the flexibility
of BNs it is straightforward to reorganize nodes and edges to
represent a wider range of real-life situations. As an example,
it would be possible to take into account the contemporary
influence of two or more informants, similarly to what has
been done by [25]. Others fields of interest are elderly care
[26], robotic-assisted surgery [27], joint-action HRI in the
performing arts [28] and autonomous driving [29]. We also
plan to use this model in a scenario where trust estimation
and intention reading will generate and modulate collaborative
behavior between humans and robots.
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